Evil or radical evil are acts which grossly harm others, such as murder and mass murder. Such acts and their perpetrators can be termed evil, or radically evil, when and where the maxims of the actors contradict the accepted values and standards of the 'culture', in the context of which they act. Thus whether the actors of evil acts can be pinned down as morally evil depends on the cultural or moral situation of the actors. Moreover, whether an actor or an act can be called simply evil or eventually radically evil is also strongly value and situation dependent. In what follows I will discuss the relation between modernity and genocide, totalitarian terror and Holocaust, by using those traditional theoretical tools.
One thing has to be said in advance. Modernity is different, or at least has become different, from all pre/modern social arrangements. Almost all essential differences concern the type of distribution of work, goods and services on the one hand, and the source of necessary knowledge on the other hand. In modernity, distribution is performed mainly by the market, whereas the cumulative development of science and technology becomes the source of knowledge. Both market and science (including technology) became increasingly universalized. Their power expands throughout the whole world. Yet neither of them yields a morally normative power. Neither the market nor modern science offers norms or codes to distinguish between good and evil, except within the territory of their own institutions.
The fundamental normative sentence of modernity is political. It states that 'all men are born free' and means, among other things, that all men have equal rights to liberty and life. This fundamental normative sentence of modernity can be effective or ineffective. It is effective if people believe in the truth of the sentence, if they take responsibility for it, if they act accordingly or at least judge others accordingly. The normative sentence is ineffective if it becomes a slogan or a kind of lip service, if its validity is limited or essentially restricted to its formal acceptance without validation.
There is a Hegelian distinction between the universal state of the world, the situation and the action. All actions are always situated, and so they are also in modernity. Yet, since modernity's fundamental sentence, the sentence concerning freedom and the free equality of men is of a universal kind, moreover, the sole shared norm of modernity, no situation can justify to overwrite this sentence and the norms implied by it. That means that whenever the fundamental sentence of modernity becomes ineffective, or is rejected offhand, everyone who has effectively signed the sentence is justifi ed to pass value judgements on social or political arrangements of the country, the institution or the movement which factually rejects the shared norm.
But how do we know that the fundamental sentence of modernity has become ineffective and when and where? Nothing is simpler than answering this question. In all cases when referring to the fundamental norm, while criticizing or rejecting any limitation put upon the valorization of the foundational normative sentence is prohibited, outlawed or sanctioned against, the fundamental normative statement is ineffective. Free speech in favour of the fundamental sentence and the mobilization of its critical power is the sole proof of the valorization of the sentence. I would not have been able to discuss evil in modernity without this preliminary remark. * * * * * Mass killing is perhaps as old as the human race. At any rate, what we now call 'world history' begins with mass killing. We learn from Homer how the Greek army attacked Troy. We also learn the fi nal result of the Trojan War. Troy was entirely destroyed, all men killed, women and children taken as slaves. And Troy was not even a natural enemy; all this happened because of a woman. The great Greek hero Heracles also destroyed a city, killed all its inhabitants, the king included, for the possession of a good-looking girl. In case of natural enemies there was not even the slightest doubt about the justifi cation of total destruction. The whole population of the once powerful Carthage was killed or taken slaves, and the city itself sprinkled with salt. Samuel burst out in anger against King Saul because he failed to kill the whole people of Amalek to the last child. These were all cases of genocide. What we now call genocide was in those times right, and even heroic acts. The same can be said about ethnic cleansing. Moreover, ethnic cleansing was regarded as an act of clemency. The population of an occupied territory was moved into another part of the empire instead of simply being killed.
Sometimes mass killing was regarded also in pre/modern times as something evil, because punishment was seen as excessive. Euripides, for example, showed empathy for the women of Troy. In such and similar cases, the principle itself was not regarded as wrong, only the execution too harsh. In fact, it took three hundred years for the fundamental normative sentence of modernity to break through the wall of the tradition. The American Indians were murdered in mass, and this murder was legitimated fi rst and foremost by their being pagans. According to the then broadly accepted principle, since Christianity is the sole true religion, all pagans, Jews and heretics are enemies of truth, and thus deserve to be murdered or even burned at the stake.
The mechanism of genocide is simple, and this simple mechanism will characterize also totalitarian terror and the Holocaust. I would say that both are cases of genocide, although special cases. Contrary to mass killings which, together with ethnic cleansing, are as old as human history, the totalitarian terror and the Holocaust are modern. They could happen only in modernity. Only modern genocide is radically evil; similarly, totalitarian terror and the Holocaust are in principle radically evil.
What is the mechanism of genocides? That single persons, single individuals do not count. More precisely, that each and every person who belongs to an ethnic group is considered solely as a member of this group. If the group is marked out for extermination, all members of the group can be, or even must be, killed. Ranks are not important anymore, nor age. All men, young or old, noble or common, wealthy or poor, are equally marked for extermination Sometimes, although not always, also all women. In this sense genocide and ethnic cleansing are egalitarian. Due to their 'vice' of being born as members of an ethnic or religious group, they must die or must leave the place where their ancestors and themselves have been born.
What transformed genocide from something natural or perhaps -for sensitive minds -even somehow wrong, into an outrageous act, as in principle evil and even radically evil? There is no radically evil act without radically evil principles. If radically evil principles become effective, if people act upon them and mobilize aggressive instincts with and through them by doing evil on a grand scale -destroying, killing systematically -then can we speak about radically evil acts. The principles occupy here the central place.
In the eyes of all those who subscribe to the fundamental value sentence of modernity -according to which everyone is born free, endowed with reason and conscience, and has equal rights for life and liberty -genocide, and even ethnic cleansing, are evil acts. They are evil acts because they disregard the fundamental moral sentence and murder members of an ethnic group because they are members of this group, be they American Indians, Armenians or Tutsis. There are other similar evil acts, for example, riots, pogroms or lynching, where we cannot speak of genocide, simply because it does not happen methodically. Cases of ethnic cleansing against enemies or purported enemies, although evil, cannot be seen as radically evil, for they are not based on guiding principles but on the traditional hatred against the so-called natural enemy or acts of revenge. For example, the expulsion of the Germans from Poland was this kind of evil. The supreme value norm was disregarded and no other or contrary norm was founded to justify these acts.
Acts are felt to be radically evil if the fundamental moral principles are not just disregarded but contrary principles, principles which contradict the values of freedom and of life, are instead accepted and acted upon. This happens only if the principles of action -whether traditional or modern -are replaced by an ideology. Since ideology itself is a modern phenomenon, I may say that although mass killing is as old as the human race, modern genocide becomes underpinned by ideologies, thus the very principles which mobilize the aggressive instincts will be increasingly ideological. From the 20th century onwards, fi rst in Europe, then on all continents, genocide has been committed mostly by the guidance of ideological principles, which contradict the message of the general value/norm of modernity.
But a structure of thought that contradicts the general value norms of modernity is also modern. Since the guiding principles of genocide -in and after the 20th century -contradict in a modern way the normative principle of modernity, acts of genocide committed by their guidance are radically evil. To avoid misunderstanding, I do not say that all ideologies can serve as principles for methodical genocide, far from it. I say only that almost all cases of genocide are nowadays committed by the guidance of an ideology as the principle for actions. And since all kinds of totalitarian regimes are underpinned by a type of ideology, genocide and totalitarian terror became strongly, intimately related. Totalitarian regimes have an affi nity to genocide and to ethnic cleansing.
Up to this point I have discussed mostly how genocide and ethnic cleansing became evil or radically evil. Even mass murder of enemies or acts of revenge against people on the grounds of their ethnic, religious or any other membership or affi liation contradict grossly the fundamental normative sentence of modernity. Acts which would not have been regarded as evil for many thousands of years became evil in our times. They do not only seem evil, they are evil. Our language has changed accordingly. In pre-modern times it was not a shameful but a heroic deed to be a conqueror. Nowadays all conquerors call themselves liberators. What was in want of no justifi cation is now in need of rationalization. The need for rationalization is born together with modernity, and ideology also fulfi lls this function.
Totalitarian mass murder is not to be understood in terms of continuity or in discontinuity with tradition. As I said, it is a thoroughly modern phenomenon both on the structural level and on the evaluative level. There are only two political formations, which belong essentially to modernity, which never existed nor could even have been conceived prior to it: liberal democracy and totalitarianism.
Let me start with a brief discussion of totalitarianism on the structural level. Modern society is essentially pluralistic on all levels. There are different political institutions, different instances of distribution and redistribution, different institutions for the production of knowledge, different forms of life, plurality of ideas, world views, religions, civic affi liations. In a liberal democracy this plurality is maintained and reproduced in and through several confl icts. In a totalitarian state, however, pluralism is outlawed. Pluralism can be outlawed only where it does exist. This is why only modern societies can become totalitarian. In the not yet entirely modern states some antediluvian forms of central control and force -like military dictatorship or tyrannycan still work. They do not work in states where pluralism has already been established. Here a central power can exercise total control only if it outlaws pluralism. The prerequisites of outlawing pluralism are fi rst an institution, usually a party, which has already outlawed pluralism within its own ranks; second, an ideology which serves as the compass for outlawing pluralism and is normally represented by a leader or by an institution with real or feigned charisma; and fi nally, terror. Certainly, autocracy, limited democracy, illiberal democracy or nondemocratic liberalism are all possible in modernity, but none of them actually exercise total control or need an ideology.
Ideology is a construction. The birth of ideologies is strongly linked to technological imagination. One creates a tool of domination by putting together bits and pieces of ideas, conceptions, religions and philosophies and fi nally presents this tool as the Truth. Since it is presented as the Truth, all facts need to be inserted into the body of an ideology. What does not fi t in is, by defi nition, untrue. And what is untrue is also dangerous -it needs to be exterminated, or at least silenced. It is not the untruth itself that needs to be exterminated or silenced but the men and women who are really, or allegedly, carriers of this 'untruth', who presumably obstruct the fi nal victory of Truth. This is why pluralism needs to be outlawed, and this is how ideology becomes the compass to outlaw pluralism.
I will treat Nazi Germany as a case of a totalitarian state. Terror is a necessary condition of totalitarian rule, yet the Holocaust is not. The Holocaust is an entirely unique event, if it can be called an event at all. This is why I will discuss it separately. Yet even if the Holocaust is a special case within a totalitarian terror state, the Holocaust could not have taken place without the very preexistence of a totalitarian state. It was a necessary condition yet not its cause.
Since ideologies vary and ideologies are the compasses for outlawing pluralism, different things, actions and ideas are prohibited and permitted in different totalitarian states and also in different periods of the development of this state. There is nowadays an ongoing discussion of whether Mussolini's fascism can be called totalitarian or not. I do not want to decide the issue, only point out why opinions can be divided. The ideology of Italian fascism was weak, since it was centered around pan-nationalism, and pan-nationalism has little ideological weight. Ideologies have the greatest weight and can be the best tools of domination if they are based on elements such as race, class or religion. These are the three instances open to fundamentalism. And a strong ideology needs to operate in a fundamentalist manner.
To avoid misunderstanding: not all kinds of fundamentalism are totalitarian or affi liated with totalitarian states and movements. Yet fundamentalism, again, is not just a kind of fanaticism. There were always fanatics, especially within the ranks of monotheistic religions. Yet fanaticism can be fundamentalist only in modern societies. For only in a world where there are no more inherited, traditional fundaments can one construct a world/image as an artifi cial foundation. Ours is, namely, a world that has no foundation, or rather founded on freedom, on a 'foundation' which does not found. 1 Fundamentalism is thus fanaticism typical for modern times and is the condition of the emergence of totalitarian regimes. Even if not all kinds of fundamentalism are ideologies, ideologies on their part have to be ready made for a fundamentalist frame of mind. And since they are the conditions of totalitarian regimes, fanaticism belongs to the necessary conditions of totalitarianism. I will briefl y exemplify what has been said with regard to the three main ideologies of modern totalitarianism -race, class and religion.
Since Nazi Germany operated with a racist ideology, every opinion which openly challenged the ideology of the race, especially the superiority of the so-called Aryan race, was outlawed. This implied several things. First, a belief that the Aryan (Northern) race has the right to world domination and to subject all inferior races to its might. This doctrine implied the prohibition of sexual intercourse between a German and a man or woman of an inferior race, the discrimination against Jews (which was not yet the Holocaust but the condition for it), the prohibition of homosexuality, the methodical murder of the mentally sick and of other disabled. Second, since the health of the race was one of the strongest items of this ideology, 'unhealthy' spiritual activity, like oppositional papers, cabaret, avant garde works of art, and liberalism in general, had to be outlawed, and unhealthy books (written by leftist, Jewish or other degenerate authors) burned.
Several items and activities outlawed by the Nazis were not outlawed, and were sometimes even promoted, in the Soviet Union, for there the leading ideology was different. It was not a race ideology but a class ideology, although the term of 'class alien' has a strong racist bytaste. Here private property was outlawed, and so were all opinions which only slightly deviated from the so-called offi cial line. In contemporary Iran, a woman cannot appear on the street without a veil, and opera is outlawed, because of the doctrine of the leading ideology: Islamism. Needless to say, opera fl ourished both in Nazi Germany and in the Soviet Union, and women were not required to cover their heads.
This was only a brief illustration of how ideology serves as the compass for prohibitions. I mention again that ideologies are constructed as useful tools and that they should not be identifi ed with several bits and pieces which were inserted into their body. Nazi ideology has nothing to do with the philosophy of Nietzsche and the music dramas of Wagner, Soviet ideology has nothing to do with Karl Marx and Islamism has nothing to do with Islam, as religion. They are just used as tools for domination.
But whether race, class or religion serve as ideology, there is something common to all three. Individual people are going to be discriminated against, locked up in prisons, deported to concentration camps and death camps on the grounds of which cluster they belong to. The very existence of these ideologies indicates a strong preference for the principle of deterrence as against the principle of retribution. One does not punish single individuals, even if entirely unjustly, because they did this or that, except in the spectacle of show trials. Generally, one prevents whole groups of people, whole 'races', ethnic groups and so-called alien classes, from doing something, or just for being what they are, by imprisoning and murdering their members. Now I come to the last necessary constituent of totalitarianism: terror. Terror is as modern as totalitarianism. In fact, it preceded totalitarianism. It fi rst appeared as the French terreur. It was Robespierre who coined the slogan 'virtue and terror'. And, indeed, the totalitarian leaders and masses while exercising terror claimed for themselves virtue. Every terrorist group up until today believes itself to be the very repository of virtue. What is terror? The term itself has a double meaning. It means the methodical exercise of violence by the state, or by an organized group mostly supported by a state, and it means also fear. And, indeed, terror is both. The methodical exercise of violence spreads fear, and it is mainly due to this fear that every protest against the methodical use of state violence remains sporadic and ineffective.
Terror is methodical and centrally organized, and this is how it differs from lynching or pogrom. Yet it has something in common with them: it targets the noncombatants, without provocation, and also hits randomly. There is always method in its execution, yet there is no obvious method in its selection. No one knows why he and not his neighbor was arrested and executed. Terror lies in no need to give reasons for any concrete terrorist action. This is the 'ratio' of terror. Everyone should be afraid if no one knows who will be the next target. As in cases of genocide in general, members of a group are targeted, for example so-called aristocrats in the French Revolution, kulaks in the Soviet Union, intellectuals in the Chinese cultural revolutions, city dwellers in Kampuchea. But out of those target groups people are still randomly selected. This is the model of totalitarianism symbolized by the word Gulag.
I mention in brackets that terror is executed everywhere in the same way. Not just in targeting a group of people without selecting special targets, but also by aiming to kill noncombatants randomly picked. This characterizes also the actions of most suicide bombers and contemporary international terrorists in general. Contemporary international terror is also centrally organized and goes on methodically; it also chooses its targets among noncombatants randomly, without their provocation, yet it is not the arm of one single established totalitarian state.
Yet why is terror a necessary ingredient of a totalitarian regime? Precisely because it centres around an ideology and not around an interest, although it can also serve interests. Ideology is based on two pillars. One pillar is enthusiasm, unconditional faith in the truth of the ideology and in the grandeur and wisdom of the leaders; the other is terror, that is, the methodical exercise of violence while spreading fear. The less people are enthusiastic about the grandeur and truth of ideology, the more terror is needed. I add that there are two territories of terror, the internal and the external. The internal terror can be diminished if the external terror increases, for example by occupying foreign territories in war or by threatening them with war.
Genocide and ethnic cleansing are common practice in all totalitarian states. It is perpetrated on a grand scale. Due to modern organizing technology, weapons and methods, totalitarian states operate as perfect killing machines. Their perfection depends on their purpose and on the lengths of time available for them. When I use the term 'genocide' I know that it does not entirely fi t, because the target groups are not necessarily ethnic -they can be so-called 'class' targets as well. And as I have already remarked, even in the 20th and 21st centuries it is not just totalitarian states that practise genocide. So do, for example, some non-totalitarian states and movements in Africa. But these mass killings only in part result from modernity. Finally, by a rough estimate, the victims of the genocides of totalitarianism amount to between 50 and 100 million people under the clear sun of Enlightenment, in modernity. This is not a valid number, for it amounts, if I may say so, to infi nity. Infi nite are the victims of a world which prided itself for being progressive and enlightened.
True, some of the perpetrators revolted, and still revolt, against the promises of the Enlightenment, for example Nazism and Islamism, yet it is also true that some others -for example the Bolshevists and their followers -have claimed to realize the promises of a progressive philosophy. Something went wrong. Radical evil, and not just evil, celebrated its greatest, even if -perhaps -only temporary, victory in the 20th century. There is now, perhaps again, cause for jubilation. For the time being there is no totalitarian state in Europe. And after all it was in Europe that ideology had been invented. Europe also invented totalitarianism, in both of its secular versions.
But there is another side to the coin. The collapse of totalitarianism in Europe was partially due to non-European states, fi rst of all the United States, and it was fairly contingent. European totalitarianism could have survived. And it survived on other continents. It is, and remains, an ever present danger. Ideologies can change, yet totalitarianism as the sole modern alternative to liberal democracy is going to raise its ugly face again and again. The conditions for totalitarianism are organic constituents of modernity. Thus, one does not need to be a prophet to foresee this eventuality.
Until this point I have spoken about Nazism as one case of a symbolic word: the 'Gulag'. Now I will speak about Nazism in reference to another symbolic word: 'Auschwitz'. I will use mostly the symbolic word Auschwitz, and not Holocaust, albeit the Holocaust did not take place solely in Auschwitz. But I believe -together with members of the History and Memory school -in the emotional and interpretative signifi cance of the places of memory. Auschwitz, just like Gulag, is such a symbolic place of memory.
The word Auschwitz stands for an entirely unique case of genocide. It does not belong to any type of genocide. This is not to be understood as a moral judgement. As far as morality is concerned millions of victims are millions of victims entirely independently of the class or race of victims and the ideology of the victimizers. All of them are acts of radical evil. But there are both empirical and ontological differences.
Auschwitz is the symbol of the so-called 'fi nal solution of the Jewish question'. This formulation, which described the Nazi project of the extermination of the entire Jewish population of Europe, deserves attention. The extermination of the Jews appears here as a case of problem-solving. Problemsolving is a rational category of instrumental thinking. Mass murder, genocide, is thus presented here as a rational procedure, as a technical matter. Not even hatred is presupposed: basically, no human emotion is needed to perform the task, because a technological task does not need emotions, just expertise. To solve the problem well requires minimal input and maximal output. It took some time and some experimentation until the Nazi apparatus solved this problem, by using gassing for mass murder. To provide gas for the gas chambers of Auschwitz required, indeed, minimal input, and the output was maximal. Roughly half a million Hungarian Jews alone went up into smoke from the crematoria in Auschwitz.
Genocide in the 20th century employed mostly modern technology, for example trains for transport or machine guns and bombardment for murder or electric fences around the camps. But no genocide before or after mobilized modern instrumental thinking in setting a goal and using the best means to realize this goal. In the model of Auschwitz two kinds of instrumental thinking appeared in concert. First, economizing; second, employing optimal technological solutions. The procedure and the concept of procedure became abstracted from the kind of problem to which they were applied. That is, the very circumstance that human beings were murdered had not been considered. Better to say that murder was not conceived as murder at all but, to repeat, as problem-solving. Problem-solving is not retribution. Not even deterrence. Traditional genocide was considered retribution, and even totalitarian terror can function as deterrence, or at least can be rationalized as deterrence, even if it is not. But exactly because of this, roles can be reversed. It happened frequently, for example, that someone sent to the Gulag had on his part a few years earlier sent others to the Gulag. After many sessions of self-criticism, victims of the Cultural Revolution could become also the main victimizers, and former communists could turn into loyal Nazis. But this was impossible in the case of the Jews. Here the roles could not be reversed. This was, I add, good moral luck for us Jews.
The fi nal solution targeted the maximum quantity for murder, yet the quality of the murdered remained the same. They were the Jews, in a racist term, independently of their national affi liation, religion, class or anything else. Now, racism is also a modern ideology. It is a so-called scientifi c ideology that prides itself on being up to date. Race, in Nazi terms, is not like ethnicity. It is not an affi liation but a quasi biologically determined so-called 'fact'. It is not even visible. It can be hidden, it must be 'discovered', unveiled. Of course, there are no races in the terms the Nazis defi ned, and their science was just a tool for legitimacy, yet it was an important one, for Jews, unlike blacks and Asians, cannot be recognized simply by looking at them.
It is by now obvious why Auschwitz could happen only in modernity. Modern methods, means, technology and thinking together were its conditions, although not its causes. Modern problem-solving thinking was applied in the extermination of European Jews. The method of thinking was rational, instrumentally rational, yet why the Jews? Why them? They were not enemies of Germany. Most German Jews were in fact extremely loyal and many of them had not even identifi ed themselves as Jews, seeing themselves perhaps as good Christians or disbelievers. The answer to the question 'why the Jews?' cannot be rational. For there is no rational answer. Even less can we provide rational answers to the fact that the German war machine preferred sending Hungarian Jews by train to Auschwitz rather than sending those trains to the Eastern front. At the end, the so-called solution of the Jewish problem also became entirely irrational if seen from the perspective of the German war effort. Why then?
If we compare this, for example, with other kinds of totalitarian genocides, we see the difference between rationality and irrationality. I said that terror plays a special function in totalitarianism. The victims are noncombatants, they are hit randomly, and the selection itself is irrational even if it targets a special group, such as aristocracy, or the kulaks. Terror as general fear becomes overwhelming, for no one knows who will be the next. This is also true for Nazism if it is seen just as an exemplifi cation of the symbolic Gulag. Yet not if it is seen as the exemplifi cation of Auschwitz. For the targets in the case of Auschwitz were not random targets. Jews were targeted for the fi nal solution, not certain Jews but all Jews and only Jews. This is why the Gypsy case was different. It was a case of random selection, of genocide yet not Holocaust. Since Jews were targeted for Auschwitz and only Jews, the population at large had nothing to fear. They were not Jews, thus they could not become targets. In the case of the constant and increasing persecution of the Jews, a signifi cant part of the non-Jewish population participated willingly, sometimes with great pleasure and enthusiasm. Ideology mobilized the worst human instinct, as in all cases of radical evil. Yet as far as the last stage of the fi nal solution was concerned, the population was kept in ignorance. Several reasons can be given for the silence, which, at the end, surrounded the fi nal solution. I do not talk about them. I mention this circumstance only to emphasize again that the last, and most murderous, acts of the fi nal solution were irrational if seen from the perspective of the German war effort. Instrumental reason turned out to be unreason.
Totalitarianism belongs to modern history, and it implies genocide in a broader understanding. Radical evil has not disappeared but has just taken new forms. Holocaust is an entirely unique phenomenon among modern cases of genocide, for in the case of Auschwitz the fundamental norms of modernity, together with the inherited supreme values, were not just misused, forgotten, deformed, but out-rightly and openly denied. As Thomas Mann formulated in his short story 'The Law', Nazis had not just broken all the ten commandments but had also proclaimed that they were invalid. They did not say we should not murder, while practising murder, and had not simply explained why their murder was not a murder. Instead, the Nazis said: you should murder.
Why exactly the Jews then? Why were the individual targets not randomly chosen although they were not combatants, enemies, conspirators? Why all? The so-called Jewish question is not new. It is the oldest question, which goes back to the Roman Empire before the birth of Christianity, continues through the Middle Ages and into modernity and is still on the agenda. Jews were persecuted, put into ghettos, murdered randomly in pogroms, expelled
